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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the phenomenon of online misinformation and junk news circulating on social media
has come to constitute an important and widespread problem affecting public life online across the
globe, particularly around important political events such as elections. At the same time, there have
been calls for more transparency around misinformation on social media platforms, as many of
the most popular social media platforms function as “walled gardens," where it is impossible for
researchers and the public to readily examine the scale and nature of misinformation activity as it
unfolds on the platforms. In order to help address this, we present the Junk News Aggregator, a
publicly available interactive web tool, which allows anyone to examine, in near real-time, all of the
public content posted to Facebook by important junk news sources in the US. It allows the public
to gain access to and examine the latest articles posted on Facebook (the most popular social media
platform in the US and one where content is not readily accessible at scale from the open Web), as
well as organise them by time, news publisher, and keywords of interest, and sort them based on all
eight engagement metrics available on Facebook. Therefore, the Aggregator allows the public to
gain insights on the volume, content, key themes, and types and volumes of engagement received by
content posted by junk news publishers, in near real-time, hence opening up and offering transparency
in these activities as they unfold, at scale across the top most popular junk news publishers. In this
way, the Aggregator can help increase transparency around the nature, volume, and engagement with
junk news on social media, and serve as a media literacy tool for the public.
Keywords data mining · social media · misinformation · Facebook · elections · interactive tool
1 Introduction
The phenomenon of online misinformation and junk news circulating on social media has come to constitute an
important problem affecting public life online across the globe, particularly around important political events such as
elections. This phenomenon has become so widespread, and has continued to grow in scale and sophistication over
the years, that it has been recognised as posing an important threat to the health of online political discourse and to
democratic processes. At the same time, the volume, nature, and engagement with such content has often been difficult
for researchers or the public to examine, due to the closed nature of many of the most popular social media platforms.
In order to address this issue, in this paper we present the Junk News Aggregator(JNA)1, a website comprised of a suite
of interactive web tools made publicly available, which allows the public to examine, in near real-time, all of the public
content posted to Facebook by important junk news sources in the US.
1https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk/
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Junk news sources are news sources that deliberately publish misleading, deceptive or incorrect information purporting
to be real news about politics, economics or culture. This content includes ideologically extreme, hyper-partisan, or
conspiratorial news and information, as well as various forms of propaganda.
The goal in building the JNA was to help shed light on the problem of junk news on social media, to make this issue
more transparent, and to help improve the public’s media literacy. We also aimed to help journalists, researchers,
policy-makers, and social media platforms understand the impact of junk news on public life.
We first launched the JNA on November 1st 2018, in the lead-up to the 2018 US midterm elections, as the previous US
elections in 2016 were recognised for the online misinformation that was circulated, and misinformation in relation to
US politics has far from ceased since. This tool allows the public to gain access to and examine the latest articles posted
on Facebook, the most popular social media platform in the US and one where content is not readily accessible at scale
from the open Web, as well as filter them by time (from the last hour to one month in the past), news publisher, and
keywords of interest, and sort them based on all eight engagement metrics available on Facebook.
The JNA offers three tools, each of which offers a different type of window into this activity: a full interactive Explorer
with all the filtering and sorting functionality, and a Daily Visual Grid2 of all images in this activity which links to the
full aggregator, as well as a static Daily Top-10 List3 showing the posts that received the most engagement in the last
day. Therefore, the Aggregator allows the public to gain insights on the volume, content, key themes, and types and
amount of engagement received by content posted by junk news publishers, in near real-time, hence opening up and
offering transparency in these activities, at scale across the top most popular junk news publishers. In this way, the
Aggregator can help increase transparency around the nature, volume, and engagement with junk news on social media,
and serve as a media literacy tool for the public.
The JNA takes as an input a list of websites and their associated public Facebook Pages, so it can be deployed to track
any set of public Facebook Pages of interest. In the future, we plan to extend the JNA so that it can track junk news
related to future elections or other important political events, potentially tracking multiple such events at the same time.
The JNA is an interactive web tool for exploring junk news stories posted on Facebook in the lead-up to the US
midterms, and it enables website visitors to examine and parse content posted by junk news sources on Facebook in
near real-time. It make visible the depth of the junk news problem, displaying the quantity and the content of junk news,
as well as the levels of engagement with it. Junk news content can be sorted by time and by engagement numbers, as
well as via keyword search (such as for a candidate, district, or specific issue). It also offers a visual overview (the Daily
Visual Grid), and a top-10 snapshot of the day’s most engaged-with junk news (the Daily Top-10 List).
This paper describes the JNA – how it was built, what data it displays, and the methodology based on which the data
was collected. The paper is strucutred as follows: the first section presents relevant background, discussing what junk
news is, and the context of online misinformation. The second section proceeds to describe the methodology used to
collect data for the JNA. Next, the paper discusses how the collected data is presented on the JNA website, discussing
each of the three tools made available for the user to examine, organise, and explore junk news posts on Facebook. The
paper ends with a brief concluding remarks on the goals and contributions of the JNA.
2 Background
2.1 What is “junk news"?
Per the definitions in Bolsover and Howard (2018), Gallacher et al. (2018), Howard et al. (2017), Howard et al. (2018),
and Woolley and Howard (2017), the term “junk news" refers to various forms of propaganda and ideologically extreme,
hyper-partisan, or conspiratorial political news and information. The term includes news publications that present
verifiably false content as factual news. This content includes propagandistic, ideologically extreme, hyper-partisan,
or conspiracy-oriented news and information. Frequently, attention-grabbing techniques are used, such as lots of
pictures, moving images, excessive capitalization, personal attacks, emotionally charged words and pictures, populist
generalizations, and logical fallacies. It presents commentary as news. The term refers to a news source overall, i.e.
based on content that is typically published by a source, rather than referring to an individual article. Further context on
junk news and online misinformation can be found in the next section.
The five criteria listed in Table 1 are used to determine whether a website is a source of junk news. If a website satisfies
the majority, i.e. three or more, of these five criteria, it is considered a source of junk news.
2https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk/index.php#visual_jna
3https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk/top10.php
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Table 1: Junk News Criteria
Criterion (Abbreviation) Full Description
Professionalism (P) These sources do not employ standards and best practices of
professional journalism. They refrain from providing clear infor-
mation about real authors, editors, publishers and owners. They
lack transparency and accountability, and do not publish correc-
tions on debunked information.
Style (S) These sources use emotionally driven language with emotive
expressions, hyperbole, ad hominem attacks, misleading head-
lines, excessive capitalization, unsafe generalizations and logical
fallacies, moving images, and lots of pictures and mobilizing
memes.
Credibility (Cr) These sources rely on false information and conspiracy theories,
which they often employ strategically. They report without con-
sulting multiple sources and do not fact-check. Sources are often
untrustworthy and standards of production lack reliability.
Bias (B), Left-wing bias (LB),
Right-wing bias (RB)
Reporting in these sources is highly biased, ideologically skewed
or hyper-partisan, and news reporting frequently includes strongly
opinionated commentary and inflammatory viewpoints.
Counterfeit (Ct) These sources mimic established news reporting. They counter-
feit fonts, branding and stylistic content strategies. Commentary
and junk content is stylistically disguised as news, with references
to news agencies and credible sources, and headlines written in a
news tone with date, time and location stamps.
Aggregator of junk news (JN
AGGR)
These sources aggregate other sources that are themselves deemed
to be junk news sources based on the above criteria.
2.2 Online misinformation and content typologies
The above criteria for junk news are part of a typology for classifying news content (a recent version of this typology
can be found in Marchal et al. (2018)). This section motivates and contextualises the need for such a typology.
Following the highly contentious 2016 US presidential election, there has been a growing body of empirical work
demonstrating how large volumes of misinformation can circulate over social media during critical moments of public
life (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Vosoughi et al., 2018). Scholars have argued that the spread
of “computational propaganda" sustained by social media algorithms can negatively impact democratic discourse and
disrupt digital public spheres (Bradshaw and Howard, 2018; Howard and Woolley, 2016; Persily, 2017; Tucker et al.,
2017; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017). Indeed, both social network infrastructure and user behaviors provide capacities
and constraints for the spread of computational propaganda (Bradshaw and Howard, 2018; Flaxman et al., 2016; Marwick
and Lewis, 2017; Pariser, 2011; Wu, 2017). Yet, the body of work that is devoted to conceptualizing misinformation
phenomena faces a number of epistemological and methodological challenges, has remained fragmentary, is ambiguous
at best and lacks a common vocabulary boyd (2017); Fletcher et al. (2018); Wardle and Derakhshan (2017). Terminology
on misinformation has become highly contentious, constantly being weaponised by politically motivated actors to
discredit media reporting (Neudert, 2017; Woolley and Howard, 2018).
There have been a few attempts to systematically operationalize fake news as a concept. The primary challenge is
that it is impossible to evaluate the amount of fact checking that goes into a particular piece of writing at a scale
sufficient for saying something general about the trends on a social media platform. Most researchers—and indeed most
citizens—have manual heuristics for evaluating sources that deliberately publish or aggregate misleading, deceptive or
incorrect information purporting to be real news about politics, economics or culture. For different social media users
there are different ways of evaluating the qualities of news and political information on social media.
Typologies in political communication research have been useful for frame analysis for the study of news, or the
organization of event-based datasets in which media accounts provide the primary features for important incidents
(Althaus et al., 2001; Erickson and Howard, 2007). Even before social media, scholars used such methods to expose
the ways in which sensational news organizations used human interest frames, while serious news organizations used
responsibility and conflict frames (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). In order to understand what users were actually
sharing over social media, we have developed a typology of political news and information.
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Content typologies are of central importance to the study of political communication, and for many years the broad
categories and subcategories of political news and information have remained widely accepted by researchers, though of
course there is debate over how transportable such traditional categories are to new media political communication Earl
et al. (2004); Karlsson and Sjøvaag (2016). However, the recent attention and debate over the effects of junk news in the
media ecosystem have forced researchers—especially those working in political communication and social media—to
re-evaluate the production models, normative values, and ideational impact of political news and information of social
media with new categories and definitions that are actually grounded in the content being shared over social media
Tandoc Jr et al. (2018). Currently, the debate lacks a grounded and comparative framework of the types of information
that circulate on social media, and remains detached from evidence of social media sharing behavior. The rigorously
composed typologu we use advances this debate, and is based on a focused, cross-case comparison of key political
events in the US.
The typology we use proceeds from a recognition that what users consume and share over social media in their political
conversations is not simply news, but could include a wide variety of sources for political news and information,
including user-generated content, conspiratorial alternative media outlets, and entertainment outlets. Indeed, there is
significant research that humorous content is a staple of information sharing in contemporary political communication
Becker (2012); Becker et al. (2010); Moy et al. (2005). Given the lack of guidance in the existing literature on what
information users are sharing, a grounded and iterative method of cataloguing content and evaluation is especially
relevant.
3 Methodology
The JNA offers the public a suite of three tools, which enable one to track in near real-time the junk news content
being posted and engaged with on Facebook, and to filter this information by time, keyowrd, and by each of the eight
engagement types available on Facebook.
The JNA queries Facebook every hour on the hour, using the public Facebook Graph API, and collects only public data.
No sensitive, personal or user-identifying data is collected. Specifically, it queries a list of Public Facebook Pages of
specific junk news publishers. These junk news publishers were chosen because their web content was found to be
particularly frequently discussed in social media conversations relating to the 2018 US midterm elections. The list of
junk news publishers was assembled and utilised in the JNA according to the following sequence of steps:
1. Select Twitter hashtags relevant to the 2018 US midterm elections. Ensure that these hashtags relate to this
specific election and not to other 2018 elections around the world, and ensure the list of hashtags is balanced,
in the sense of covering both right and left-leaning hashtags.
2. Use the Twitter Streaming API, to get any other hashtags that are mentioned together with the hashtags in
our list: get all tweets mentioning any of the hashtags in our list, and from these tweets, get other hashtags
mentioned in those tweets. This snowball sampling of hashtags results in an expanded list of hashtags. This
snowball sampling for the hashtags happened from September 15 to September 19, 2018. The list of hashtags
used is shown in Table 2.
3. Using this expanded hashtag list, use the Twitter Streaming API to retrieve all English-language tweets
(including retweets and quote tweets) mentioning any of these hashtags. This data collection resulted in
2,541,544 tweets posted in the period September 21 to September 30, 2018.
4. Out of this set of tweets, get all the URLs they mention. Keep only the base URL (i.e. not a specific article’s
URL but the homepage URL), and count how many times each base URL was mentioned.
5. Give this list of URLs to exparts trained in the US context (trained human annotators or “coders"), to classify
all URLs into categories of news and political content, using a grounded typology Woolley and Howard (2018).
For the junk news category, there exist five criteria, so if a news source satisfies at least three of these five
criteria, it gets classified under this category. To train our team of US experts to categorize sources of political
news and information according to our grounded typology, we established a rigorous training system. For
the analysis of the 2018 US midterms, we worked with a team of three coders. Each source was triple-coded.
Any conflicting decision was thoroughly discussed between coders to achieve consensus. In the event that
consensus was not achieved, an executive team of three other highly experienced coders reviewed the source
and made a final coding decision.
6. For every website in the Junk News list that has been shared on Twitter, identify their Facebook page, if they
have any. In order to establish that a given Facebook page corresponds to a given website, it is required that
either the website explicitly lists this Facebook page as theirs, and/or that the given Facebook page lists under
its ’Website’ field this particular website.
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7. Out of all junk news sites, keep only the ones that have a Facebook page. Out of those, keep only the top 50
most shared ones on Twitter (due to the Facebook Graph API’s rate limits, not all of them can be tracked).
These 50 junk news sites, along with the typology criteria which they satisfy (due to which they get classified
as junk news), can be found in Table 3, where the explanation of the code (abbreviation) used for each criterion
is described above.
Table 2: Twitter hashtags used
2018midterms getoutthevote voteblue
bluetsunami gop voteblue2018
bluetsunami2018 midtermelections votebluetosaveamerica
bluewave midterms votedemout
bluewave2018 midterms2018 votedemsout
bluewavecoming2018 rednationrising votegopout
bluewaveiscoming redwave votered
dem redwave2018 votered2018
democrat redwaverising voteredtosaveamerica
democrats redwaverising2018 walkaway
dems republican walkawayfromdemocrats2018
earlyvoting republicans whenweallvote
flipitblue uniteblue
8. Out of these 50 junk news sites, for the public Facebook page of each, retrieve the public posts authored by
them and some of the post metadata (including aggregate-level engagement numbers): every hour on the
hour, get all posts authored by these pages, not including any names of people who engage with these posts,
but rather only numbers of engagements (reactions), for all eight types of engagement that Facebook makes
available: Share, Comment, Like, Love, Haha, Wow, Sad, Angry. Write these posts to a database.
9. For the Junk News Aggregator site, retrieve data from this database of public Facebook posts by junk news
publishers, and allow site visitors to explore, sort, and filter this data by time, engagement numbers, and
keywords.
We note that, for each Facebook post collected, the displayed engagement numbers were last updated at most an hour
after the post was posted, as, due to the Facebook API’s data limits, we cannot update those again later. But the link to
the Facebook post is provided, so you can click on that to see current engagement levels for this post.
4 The JNA website
This section describes the three tools available on the JNA website: the interactive Explorer, as well as two simpler and
less interactive tools that show the top posts of the last 24 hours: the Daily Top-10 List, and the Daily Visual Grid.
4.1 The Daily Visual Grid
On the JNA homepage, one finds an interactive 16x16 image grid4. This is the Daily Visual Grid, showing square
images from the top-256 junk news posts with the most age-adjusted total engagements in the last 24 hours. Figure 1
shows a screenshot of this Daily Visual Grid.
This Daily Visual Grid updates every 24 hours at 5pm ET, and shows only the top-256 most engaged with Facebook
posts that were posted in this 24-hour period by junk news sources in a 16x16 grid. These are the top posts based on
age-adjusted total engagements (the “age-adjusted total: All" metric). Each image in the grid corresponds to a junk
news Facebook post. Hovering over an image reveals a pop-up showing more information about the relevant post: the
Facebook Page that posted it, the time and date posted, the text in the post, and engagement numbers. Clicking on an
image takes the user to the Explorer, where one can explore junk news in greater detail.
4.2 The Daily Top-10 List
From the homepage, one can navigate to the Daily Top-10 List5. This is a smaller and simpler tool than the interactive
Explorer. It uses the same data as the full Explorer, but it queries this data less frequently, once every 24 hours, at 5pm
4https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk/index.php#visual_jna
5https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk/top10.php
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Table 3: Junk News Sources and Relevant Criteria Violated
Source Junk News Criteria Satisfied
breitbart.com RB S Cr P
thegatewaypundit.com RB S Cr P
libertyheadlines.com RB S Cr
theblacksphere.net RB Cr S P
dailywire.com RB S Cr
thefederalist.com RB S Cr
rawstory.com LB Cr P
thedailydigest.org CR Ct RB P
lifenews.com RB S Cr P
infowars.com RB S Cr P
dailycaller.com RB S P
zerohedge.com Cr P S
barenakedislam.com RB S Cr P
pjmedia.com P Ct Cr
americanthinker.com RB S Cr Ct
newrightnetwork.com Ct S RB
gellerreport.com RB S Cr Ct
davidharrisjr.com RB S P
theoldschoolpatriot.com S RB Cr
100percentfedup.com RB S Cr P
committedconservative.com RB S Cr P
truthfeednews.com P Ct Cr RB
michaelsavage.com RB S Cr
bigleaguepolitics.com RB S Cr
cnsnews.com RB S Cr P
truepundit.com RB S P
thepoliticalinsider.com P Cr Ct RB
hotair.com RB S Cr
lifezette.com RB S Cr P
canadafreepress.com RB S Cr P
shareblue.com LB P CT
wnd.com Ct RB P
bizpacreview.com RB S P
rushlimbaugh.com RB P S
theblaze.com P RB Ct
frontpagemag.com RB S Cr P
redstate.com RB S Ct P
palmerreport.com LB P S
chicksonright.com RB S Cr
nworeport.me S RB P Ct
en-volve.com RB S Cr
magaoneradio.net RB S P JN AGG
twitchy.com S RB P
naturalnews.com RB S Cr P
westernfreepress.com P S RB
legalinsurrection.com RB S P Ct
conservativedailypost.com RB S Cr P
therightscoop.com RB S P
conspiracydailyupdate.com Cr S JN AGG
ET, and shows only the top 10 most engaged-with Facebook posts that were posted in this 24-hour period by junk news
sources, in terms of the overall age-adjusted total engagements these posts received. A post’s overall age-adjusted total
engagements is the sum of all engagements received by this post (the number of Likes + Comments + Shares + Love
reactions + Haha reactions + Wow reactions + Angry reactions + Sad reactions) divided by the post’s age in seconds,
where a post’s age equals the time when the post was retrieved from Facebook minus the time when the post was posted
to Facebook, with this age measured here in seconds.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the Daily Visual Grid
A screenshot of the Daily Top-10 List is shown in Figure 2.
4.3 The Explorer
From the JNA homepage, one can navigate to the full interactive Explorer6, either by clicking on any image in the
Visual Grid, or by clicking on the “Explore" tab. It shows Facebook posts posted by junk news outlets on their public
Facebook page. It shows up-to-the-hour posts, going as far back as a month into the past. A screenshot of the Explorer
is shown in Figure 3.
The user can filter posts based on how long ago they were posted (e.g. 1 hour ago, 2 hours ago, etc.), and also based on
keywords and the publisher name. The user can also sort posts, not only by when they were posted (newest/ oldest), but
also by how many engagements (or reactions) they received, for each of the eight post engagement types available on
Facebook (Likes, Comments, Shares, and the five emoji reactions: Love, Haha, Wow, Angry, Sad), and by the sum of
all engagements across all eight metrics ("All").
In addition, the user can sort posts by the age-adjusted version of each of the engagement types (number of engagements
divided by the post’s age in seconds), which shows the number of engagements a post received per second of its life on
Facebook (up to the point it was retrieved by the JNA system). Since the JNA system only queries Facebook once an
hour (due to Facebook API’s rate limits, this cannot be done more frequently), this accounts for the age of the post
at the time Facebook was queried, and offers a more appropriate measure for comparing and sorting posts based on
engagement numbers.
6https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk/news/app/
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the Daily Top-10 List
5 Conclusion
Given the proliferation of misinformation and junk news on social media platforms around important election events,
we have built the Junk News Aggregator (JNA), to enable the public to transparently and systematically examine and
parse junk news on Facebook in near real-time, hence contributing towards transparency around junk news on social
media. This is achieved through this interactive web app, by making visible the quantity and the content that US junk
news published publicly on Facebook, as well as the levels of engagement with it. This effort started shortly before
the 2018 US midterm elections, and continues to this day. The JNA website is comprised of three tools, each offering
a different window into the online activity of these junk news sources: a Daily Visual Grid, focusing on the visual
media content that these sources employ, which leads to the interactive Explorer, which displays the full content of each
Facebook post and offers more extensive filtering and sorting functionality and goes up to a month back (temporal,
keyword-based, and engagement-based, for all eight engagement actions available for Facebook posts), and the Daily
Top-10 List, offering a snapshot of the day’s top engaged-with Facebook posts from these junk news publishers. In this
manner, the JNA is the first publicly-available tool that offers insights into the content publicly uploaded to Facebook
by junk news sources, contributing towards increasing transparency around the nature, volume, and engagement with
junk news on social media, and aiming to serve as a media literacy tool for the public.
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